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by Otto R. Begus 
(Chairman, Department of 
Philosophy, Morgan State 
University) 
Sociological statistics indicate high 
crime rates in our society. The assertion 
that they are high is, of course, not 
merely a question of numbers. There is 
an acute awareness of crime which sur-
faces in the explicit inclusion of security 
measures in housing and urban de-
velopments, reminiscent of the walled 
cities and fortified castles of the Middle 
Ages, in the flight of people to "safe" 
areas, in the establishment of pre-
delinquency programs whose detailed 
record-keeping methods at least equal 
those dreamed up in the better-known 
futuristic novels, in psychological 
theories and educational practices such 
as "Behavior Modification," and also in 
the innumerable police and detective 
shows on television. Even if one allows 
for a certain ingrained societal pes-
simism, the proportions of this aware-
ness and the seriousness of its practical 
consequences alone suggest an abnor-
mal presence of crime. 
The presence of crime in any given 
society, however, is, by itself, not an ab-
normal phenomenon. In other words: as 
long as crime in a society occurs in more 
or less clearly identifiable individual 
forms and isolated incidents, the search 
for an explanation can confine itself to 
individual circumstances and 
rationale - although not reasonable 
choices. Such a form of crime is neither 
an indication of social disease nor does it 
represent an substantial threat. When, 
however, criminal activity appears as a 
widespread phenomenon, when there is 
what can be called a climate of criminal 
activity, which cannot be reduced to a 
simple addition of individual criminal ac-
tions, the quest for an explanation can-
not end with the individual. Indeed, the 
frequency, the almost indeliberate ease 
with which crimes are committed even 
for minimal gains somehow suggest the 
existence of a social context within which 
criminal actions constitute meaningful 
phenomena, or what is the same, a 
meaningful mode of social action. But 
how can actions which are apparently 
against society be socially meaningful? 
The question points to society and to an 
inter-wovenness of individual and social 
existence. What is the nature of this in-
terrelatedness? 
In accordance with the theories pro-
posed by Hobbes and Locke, society is 
the result of a social contract. Taking this 
terminology seriously, this means that: 
a. the parties to the contract must 
exist before the contract is entered 
and, therefore, also before society 
which comes into being by it. The 
"before" does not necessarily 
mean "before in time." Rather it 
indicates that the parties exist, first 
and above all, as individuals inde-
pendently of any society and that 
human existence does not eo ipso 
imply social existence; 
b. the parties enter into the social 
contract freely, i.e., by choice. 
Thus, society does not arise from 
necessity. It appears to be simply 
one of the means available to hu~ 
mans to obtain their individual 
goals. The fact that one means, 
namely society, appears to be bet-
ter, than the other - force - does 
not make the first necessary. 
It is already commonplace knowledge 
that the social contract theory was 
prompted by historical circumstances 
and by special group interests: in the 
case of Hobbes, to safeguard absolute 
authOrity by pointing out that there must 
be an impartial, stable and powerful en-
forcer of such a contract, or, as in the 
case of Locke, to promote the political 
potentialization of the bourgeoisie. But 
precisely because this theory, which in 
the meantime has become an important 
element of our own socia-political 
awareness, arises from particular inter-
ests, it is a highly unreliable source of 
socia-political intelligence. If we let the 
social phenomenon speak for itself, the 
following elements appear: 
1. The process of humanization: 
Human beings can only come into 
the fruition of their human poten-
tialities in relation with other 
human beings who have already 
developed these characteristics, as 
well as in relation with a human 
environment that promotes their 
realization. Thus, social relations 
are a necessary condition of 
human existence qua human. 
2. The process of socialization: 
Human goals and aspirations or, in 
other words, the realization of 
human existence as survival and as 
the "better" life, exceed the powers 
of the individual. This excess is not 
simply the result of utopian 
dreams. Hume, in comparing hu-
mans with the endowment of ani-
mals, finds the first at a disadvan-
tage: "Of all the animals with 
which the globe is populated there 
is none towards which nature 
seems, at first sight, to have 
exercised more cruelty than to-
wards man, in the numberless 
wants and necessities with which 
she has loaded him, and in the 
slender means which she affords to 
the relieving of these necessities ... 
*(Hume, Political Essays) However, 
there is, in accordance with Hume, 
a remedy to this situation: "It is by 
society alone that he is capable of 
supplying his defects ... By society 
all his infirmities are compensat-
ed ... When every individual labors 
apart and only for himself, his force 
is too small to execute any consid-
erable work ... Society provides a 
remedy for the following three in-
convenience: by the conjunction of 
forces our power is augmented, by 
the partition of employment, our 
ability increases, and by mutual 
succour we are less exposed to for-
tunes and accidents." (Hume,Polit-
ical Essays) If we radicalize Hume's 
statement in view of the fact that 
the very possibility of human 
existence is rooted in this conjunc-
tion of forces, abilities and con-
cerns and in view of the probability 
that the survival of the human 
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species itself is due to social in-
teraction, social relations are not 
only advantageous but a necessary 
condition of human existence qua 
existence. 
Social relations, or as we can also say, 
society, reveal itself in these two ele-
ments as a necessary condition of 
human existence. In sofar as these social 
relations received their structure from 
the actual interaction of human beings 
among themselves and with their envi· 
ronment, the concrete historical form, 
the intrinsic quality and the external 
structural support (customs, habits, 
laws) of these relations is determined by 
interests as well as material possibilities. 
Thus, although society is a'necessary 
condition of human existence from the 
point of view of human existence, soci-
ety can deny being this condition to indi-
viduals and groups that exist within its 
confines, who then are de-humanized 
into tools, living tools as Aristotle calls 
them, or to useless surplus. From this a 
contradiction results: on the one hand 
these groups or individuals are members 
of the same social habitat whose mean-
ing to them, as necessitated by their 
human condition, is their humanization 
and socialization. On the other hand, 
however, this very social habitat denies 
them this meaning and, therefore, its re-
ality. In consequence of this contradic-
tion, actions which appear to be anti-
social form the point of view of this estab-
lished social habitat can be socially 
meaningful to the perpetrator of these 
actions, precisely because it is an at-
tempted realization of what society 
necessarily means, but to them is not yet. 
It must be pointed out here that this 
does not indicate that the perpetrator of 
such actions must be refleXively aware of 
this contradiction. Where this reflexive 
awareness is lacking, he is simply acting 
out an existential situation in a necessar-
ily egocentric manner. The criminal 
phenomenon, which formed the basis of 
our question, has already steered us 
away from those trends that would seek 
its explanation in genes, chromosomes 
cor in a feeling of inadequacy based on 
corporeal differences. Certain 
sociologists have begun to point at the 
social environment as a possible source 
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of crime. Two factors are usually men-
tioned: 
1. The Family. The theory that the 
breakdown of the family is responsible 
for the rise in crime implies correctly the 
absence of a supportive social habitat. 
But it fails to mention that in our ad-
vanced industrial society the family is 
radically incapable of providing this type 
of social habitat because many basic so-
cial relations have become "public." For 
that very reason, the focus on the 
present-day family and its restoration as 
a fundamental solution to crime and 
other socially disturbing phenomena, is 
totally anachronistic. It uses that family 
as a model which was at the same time a 
center of production, or, in other words, 
a socio-economic unit. In pre-industrial 
societies, the family, whether feudal or 
otherwise, was an almost independent 
and to a large degree self-sufficient social 
body. In fact, meeting head-on with such 
family-based societies, the industrial 
evolution, which destroyed at the same 
time a democratically more hopeful but 
never fully respected socio-economic 
family unit based on home-industry, had 
to cause havoc. When it occurred, soci-
ety was totally unprepared and, because 
of prevailing interests, totally unin-
terested in providing an extra-familiar 
social habitat. In fact, it considered the 
rising proletariat as "panderers of vice," 
"mobs" and "social sores" (Jefferson, 
on Democracy) as it had considered 
those who had been unattached hire-
lings as rootless scum. Even the to some 
extent softening, albeit self-interested, 
oppressive paternalism which had 
existed between rulers and ruled in the 
feudal family, was now gone, replaced 
by totally impersonalized and de-
humanized relations between owners 
and workers, although the social re-
formers of the Victorian Age, witness 
Charles Dickens, attempted to transfer 
this paternalism to the factories and of-
fices. Slavery is, of course, the most radi-
cal expression of the absence of a mean-
ingful social habitat since it does not 
even fall under the category of feudal 
family-relations. 
2. Poverty. Some sociologists have 
come to the conclusion, again correctly 
in its over-all meaning, that poverty is the 
primary source of crime. This theory has 
to be qualified, since there are several 
types of poverty, quite distinct from one 
another: there is, first, poverty due to a 
general scarcity of resources even if 
these are justly distributed. Second, 
there is poverty by choice (mendicant 
friars in their early stages, buddhist 
monks, as well as financially highly un-
rewarding activities such as art can be, or 
the practice of medicine in economically 
extremely depressed areas), and third, 
poverty due to a socioeconomic system 
whose very reason of existence is the ac-
cumulation of wealth which, against the 
background of the private ownership of 
the sources of production translates into 
an accumulation of wealth by some and 
the deprivation of others as its necessary 
correlative. In view of these three types 
of poverty, poverty as such does not yet 
constitute a condition of criminal activity. 
It seems reasonable to suggest that the 
insufficiency of means to survive, or to 
survive humanly and within the stan-
dards made possible by the general so-
cial productivity as one of the 
experienced forms of frustrated rightful 
social expectation may make actions 
meaningful, if not necessary, which re-
sult in the appropriation of the survival 
means outside the established forms of 
acquisition or the established rules of the 
market-place. 
3. Moral Depravity. Widespread 
popular opinion maintains that the rise in 
crime results from the materialistic out-
look of our age. It is, of course, true that 
the experienced frustration of rightful 
social expectations can be sublimated by 
means of various ideologies. It is also 
true that some of these ideologies may 
acquire survival-functions. Undoub-
tedly, the doctrine of "blessed be the 
poor" lent dignity to the oppressed. But 
the farmers' uprising in Central Europe 
in the XVIth Century, for example, is a 
good indication of the fact that an ideol-
ogy of "blessed be the poor" and 
"slaves, be obedient to your masters" 
cannot assuage the conflict between so-
cial expectation and social reality, even if 
this conflict is proposed as an expression 
of God's will. Thus, in fact, the materi-
alistic outlook of our age, especially 
when it appears among oppressed 
groups, does not constitute a perversion 
at all, but rather a reaUstic appraisal of a 
situation which hitherto had been hid-
den under a "non-materiaUstic" ideol-
ogy. 
With the waning influence of religion 
as a sublimating force, another ideology 
seems to take hold, which found its early 
expression in the doctrine of "Social 
Darwinism" of which Hitler is the most 
radical representative: in accordance 
with it, the degree of socio-economic 
participation, or social standing as Her-
renstein of Harvard University puts it, is 
said to be determined by nature and its 
laws of the "survival of the fittest" (or 
today the "genes") and genetically de-
termined behavior}. Who, this theory 
seems to imply, could possibly quarrel 
with nature (or the genes)? 
Hobbes, one of the proposers of the 
social contract theory, conceived the es-
tablishment of society as a remedy of the 
natural situation of man, referred to as 
the "bellum omnium contra omes": the 
war of everyone against every-one: the 
lone animal, defending its turf. Since this 
pre-social existence lies beyond human 
experience, post-Hobbesian theoreti-
cians maintained that Hobbes had sim-
ply taken recourse to a kind of 
philosophical fiction a la Socrates, in 
order to delineate in all clarity the signifi-
cance and the essence of the social con-
tract. 
However, if we take the Hobbesian 
description of pre-societal existence as a 
description of asocietal existence, 
namely human existence as deprived of 
a humanizing and socializing habitat that 
his existence demands, it ceases to be fic-
tion and becomes fact. Indeed, Hobbes 
himself, in order to refer to an 
experience of this war-like condition, 
mentions examples that are taken out of 
British society. Let us examine some de-
tails of this description: After having 
stated that the condition of perpetual 
war does not lie so much in the various 
overt acts of war but rather in a continu-
ous presence of those conditions that 
give rise to these acts, Hobbes con-
tinues: "Whatsoever is consequent to a 
time of war where every man is enemy to 
every man, the same is consequent to 
the time wherein men live without other 
security that what their own strength and 
their own invention shall furnish them 
withal." (Hobbes, LeViathan) What is 
this security? It consists in an un-
obstructed access to the means of survi-
val. Survival itself is not a definite quan-
tum. Rather, it is determined by the gen-
eral productivity and the forms of pro-
gress. It implies, therefore, the standards 
of decent existence which vary from age 
to age. Generally, this access to the 
means of survival occurs through a par-
ticipation in their production. Where this 
participation is basically frustrated, 
human survival security is threatened 
and the individual is left to its own de-
vices. The resulting survival-solitude has 
obvious de-humaniZing consequences 
which result in these charactenstics, put 
forth by Hobbes: "In such condition, 
there is no place for industry ... and, 
which is worst of all, continual fear of 
danger and violent death; and the Ufe of 
man or woman solitary, brutish, poor, 
nasty and short." (Hubbes, Leviathan) 
Furthermore: "T 0 this war of 
everyone against everyone, this also is 
consequent: that nothing can be unjust. 
The notions of right and wrong, justice 
and injustice, have there no place. 
Where there is no common power, there 
is no law, no injustice." (Hobbes, 
Leviathan) The common power refers to 
the agreed institutionalized form of pro-
tecting the established social relations 
and the benefits derived therefrom. This 
common power, as well as the laws that 
constitute the modus vivendi of the 
societal establishment, has lost its mean-
ing to those who live at the fringes of so-
ciety and who are alienated from these 
benefits. To them, then, this common 
power is nothing else but the power of 
the hostile other whose exercise of 
power is experienced simply as force 
and fraud and must be fought with the 
same, as Hobbes says, "cardinal virtues 
in war." (LeViathan) 
Precisely because this common power 
and these common laws are common 
only in appearance but not in reality and 
meaning, the medicine of more law-
enforcement and a more radical use of 
power addresses itself only to 
symptoms. And finally, Hobbes con-
cludes with words that need no com-
mentary: "It is consequent also that the 
same condition that there be no prop-
erty, no dominion, no mine and thine 
distinct; but only to be every man's that 
he can get, and for long as he can keep it. 
And thus much for the ill condition which 
man by nature is actually placed in." 
(Leviathan) It is, as we may alter Hob-
bes' statement, notan ill condition byna-
ture, but a humanly produced denial of 
society to humans. 
Of course, the lines of societal depriva-
tion cannot be drawn with mathematical 
or statistical accuracy. In fact, a society 
that engenders oppreSSion is in itself 
questionable and fraught with internal 
contradictions that affect every member. 
But it is one of the forms of self-
protection that society will forego any 
radical self-reflection and rather point to 
the asocial element as being its own 
source of its asocial behavior. The 
down-playing of white-collar crime, the 
lack of understanding in view of the rise 
of juvenile delinquency everywhere, the 
continuous attempts to reduce crimes in 
the very power-structurer to personal 
failure and ambition are but some of 
the consequences of this lack of self-
reflection. In fact, history is filled with tes-
timonies to this self-interested unwilling-
ness to pay attention to its own condition 
as well as to its apocalyptic conse-
quences. And when it is done,it is most 
likely written off as disgruntled dissent, 
pessimism of the intellectuals, sour-
grapes attitude, or, in our post Freudian 
age, a result of wrong potty-training. 
This brief phenomenology of the aso-
cial condition would not be complete 
without a look at its self-expression. Al-
though there are many examples of it, in 
fact, popular culture is filled with them, I 
venture to choose "Martin Fierro," an 
Argentinian gaucho poem because of its 
directness, simplicity and non-
romaticizing quality. 
After killing the protege of the military 
commander of the region where Martin 
Fierro had worked for some time, he re-
flects on the condition of the gaucho, 
providing thereby an explanation of his 
behavior. The following verses are taken 
from Song VIII: (J~se Hernandez, Martin 
Fierro) 
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Since I could not expect justice here, 
I left qUitely the inn 
so as not to be noticed 
when I saw him die and 
the innkeeper started to raise his 
voice. 
Oppressed people know very well the 
difference between true justice and the 
appearance of justice. Plato, in a dispute 
on justice with Thrasymarchus brings 
forth the same distinction. Perhaps op-
pressed people cannot formulate it as 
well, but they know. Thus, Martin Fier-
ro's flight is simply an act of self-
conservation in the face of tyranny. 
I climbed the horse and prayed to God 
and left for a different territory. 
Since the gaucho is called a bum 
He cannot have a home. 
From place to place he must move 
Never finding peace. 
He is always in flight, 
Always poor and persecuted; 
He has no resting-place, no cave 
as if he were damned; 
Indeed, to be a gaucho, damn-it, 
To be a gaucho is a crime. 
r 
A GOOD IDEA 
The extemal rootlessness is only an 
expression of societal deprivation or 
societal rootlessness. Furthermore, the 
respectless image of the gaucho, the 
criminal, the oppressed is their aliena-
tion: they must live the imposed image 
which, in tum, becomes their fate: iden-
tification with the ideology of oppression 
where each attempt to break away from 
it results in a necessarily hostile action 
against the oppressor. 
He has no children, no wife, 
no friends, and no protectors. 
All are his masters, 
but no one will shield him. 
He suffers the fate of the ox: 
what happens to it if he does not pull 
the plow? 
His condition is solitary. Exploited by 
everyone, everyone becomes his 
enemy: the war of everyone against 
everyone is, in fact, the war of the iso-
lated one for survival against the societal 
other which excludes him as an equal 
participant. Only to appease his masters 
does he accept his designated position, 
but even so this only serves to per-
petuate his suffering. 
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His house is the hay-stack, 
his den the desert; 
And if, half-dead with hunger, 
he catches a piglet, 
they run after him 
because he is a gaucho thief. 
Indeed, no mine and thine, as Hobbes 
says, because the thine holds power 
over everything, even over the basic 
means of survival of the oppressed. 
He gains nothing when there is peace, 
And when there is war, he is the first to 
go; 
They do not forgive him when he is 
mistaken, 
because they do not know how to for-
give. 
The gaucho in this world is only useful 
at the polls. 
In fact, the condition of society means 
nothing to him since it does not affect 
him. War or peace, the fate of the op-
pressed is the same. Nor does he profit 
from political freedom, the right to vote, 
since the interests that determine the 
exercise of political power have already 
b.een determined. His disinterest in soci-
ety is a sign of his societal deprivation. In 
fact, it reminds him of his utter power-
lessness, as the next verse indicates: 
For him are the stockades 
the hard prisons. 
In his mouth there are no reasons 
Although he might have reason 
enough to speak. 
But, the reasons of the poor. 
Are like wooden bells. 
Let's go, fate, let's go together! 
Together we were borne 
and together we must live, 
unable to separate. 
So, I l,.I,ill open with my knife 
the path I have to follow. 
Every exit to a meaningful existence 
within a meaningful sodal habitat 
blocked, he must resort to the raw and 
naked weapons of survival, "force" a 
cardinal virtue in the war of everyone 
against everyone. The fact that Martin 
Fierro refers to his condition as fate, as 
an unfortunate but unalterable fact, indi-
cates that he simply acts out his oppres-
sed condition which turns this reflection 
into a lamentation rather than a reflec-
tion. It is a lamentation, however, which 
expresses the components of asocial 
existence: historical rootlessness, lack of 
respect, self-alienation, material aliena-
tion, self-affirmation through physical 
violence, survival by force and fraud, 
and despair. How did Hobbes express 
it? "In such condition, there is no place 
for industry ... and which is the worst of 
all, continual fear of danger and violent 
death; and the life of humans solitary, 
brutish, poor, nasty and short." 
(Leviathan) 
The purpose of these reflections was 
to expose the relationship between crim-
inal actions as perpetrated by individuals 
and society. In fact, every action is an ac-
tion of an individual. However, the indi-
vidual exists from its very beginning as a 
social individual. Thus, the absence or 
presence of a habitat where this dimen-
sion can be lived out is of vital impor-
tance to the way in which human 
existence realizes itself. 
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by James F. Schneider 
For as many years as there has been a 
University of Baltimore, there has been a 
University of Baltimore School of Law. 
The law school and a business school 
were founded together in the summer of 
1925 to fill a widespread public demand 
for a quality professional education. 
The establishment of the University 
came in response to actions taken by 
already-existing institutions of higher 
education in the Baltimore area. In the 
middle 1920' s, the University of Mary-
land lengthened its evening law program 
to four years and began to require two 
years of college as a prerequisite to law 
school; Johns Hopkins added two years 
to its Commerce School course. Rising 
standards of admission meant that many 
competent people would be prevented 
from obtaining a legal or business educa-
tion. 
These changes seemed entirely un-
necessary at a time when the only re-
quirements for admission to the bar were 
a high school diploma and a law degree; 
many practical members of the legal and 
business communities refused to ac-
cept the changes. 
A meeting of indignant citizens was 
called in June 1925 at the University 
Club at Charles and Madison Streets by 
Dr. Maynard A. Clemens (1879-1961), 
an innovative leader of higher education 
in Maryland who had already found the 
Baltimore College of Commerce, and 
the College of Commerce at the Univers-
ity of Maryland, and who would in the fu-
ture found Eastem College (1928) and 
the Mount Vernon School of Law 
(1935), to decide what should be done. 
Among others at the meeting were 
Eugene A. Edgett, Assistant State's At-
torney for Baltimore City; Clarence W. 
Miles, Peoples Counsel; and Howell A. 
King, then associated with the School of 
Business Administration at the Univers-
ity of Maryland. A decision was reached 
to found the University of Baltimore to 
satisfy the need for a downtown law and 
business school where young men and 
women could receive a practical educa-
tion without frills and their resultant 
expense. In August 1925, the University 
was granted its corporate charter by the 
State of Maryland. 
Charles W. Heuisler, a seventy-years 
old Judge who had retired from the Sup-
reme Bench of Baltimore City the previ-
ous November, agreed to serve as the 
first Dean of the law school. A law faculty 
of competent career lawyers who could 
teach in the evenings was constructed. 
The first location chosen for the school 
was on the southeast corner of St. Paul 
Street and Mount Vernon Place. The 
first classes of the University of Baltimore 
began there on October 1, 1925, for 
sixty-two law students and one hundred 
and fourteen business students. 
The first class of thirty-eight law stu-
dents was graduated from the three-year 
evening program in 1928, just in time for 
the school to be accredited by Maryland 
State Department of EdUcation. Even 
though a college degree was not then 
required by the school, some of its first 
law graduates were holders of a 
Bachelor's Degree. An annex was 
opened at St. Paul and Centre Streets, 
and in 1929, the former site ofthe Balti-
more College of Dental Surgery at 847 
N. Howard Street, now known to us as 
"Howard Hall," was purchased and be-
came the first permanent site of the 
University of Baltimore. 
State Senator William Milnes Maloy 
(1874-1949) became the second Dean 
of the Law school upon the death of 
Dean Heuisler in February 1929. An 
honor society named in memory of the 
late Dean, to comprise the top ten per-
cent of each graduating law class was es-
tablished in March 1932, and continues 
to this day. 
DUring the first ten years of its 
existence, the University of Baltimore 
had three Presidents: Dr. Maynard A. 
Clemens served as Acting Chancellor 
until his resignation in 1926; he was suc-
ceeded by Dr. Wilbur F. Smith, elected 
first President serving until 1933; and fi-
nally, Howell A. King, serving as Acting 
President for about two years. On its 
tenth anniversary in 1925, the Univers-
ity of Baltimore boasted nearly one 
thousand graduates of its law and bUsi-
ness schools. 
In the fall of 1937, a two-year junior 
college program was begun under the 
supervision of Dr. Theodore Halbert 
Wilson (1885- ), the University's 
education advisor, Dr. Wilson was to 
serve nearly three years in this capacity 
until the Board of Trustees announced 
his election as President in July 1940. 
In 1940, the law shcool began offering 
a two-year course toward a Master of 
Laws Degree, graduating its first class of 
LL. M's in 1942. The program con-
tinued until 1960, when it was discon-
tinued. In 1946, Dean Maloy retired; As-
sistant Dean John H. Hessey (1890-
) became the third Dean of the Law 
School. Post-war growth of the Univers-
ity prompted the purchase of the former 
site of the Baltimore Athletic Club in 
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